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I INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of the Employment Relations Act 2000 brought about a change in 
focus for the employment law of the country. The exact extent of that change in focus was 
destined to wait for the Act ' s analysis by the Court of Appeal. The case of Coutts Cars Ltd 
v Baguley was the first case under the new legislative regime to reach the Court of Appeal 
level on the issue of redundancy law. The Court's analysis of the Act was anticipated to 
herald a new direction for employment law, being based as it was under the founding 
principle in the Act of good faith. Coutts Cars v Baguley is of primary interest as it sets out 
the views of the current Court of Appeal on the extent that the law of redundancy in 
particular was impacted by the passage of the new legislation. The Court considered the 
issues of the extent of consultation and the amount of information required to be provided 
to an employee facing the prospect of redundancy. It also gave its views on the relevance 
of employment case law developed under the prior regime of the Employment Contracts 
Act 1991. 
This paper will analyse the Coutts Cars v Baguley case from its beginning in the 
Employment Relations Authority, through the appeal to the Employment Court, and its 
final decision in the Court of Appeal. It will also attempt to provide some analysis of the 
sensibility of the Court of Appeal decision. 
II FACTS 
Mr Baguley was a car groomer employed by luxury car dealer Coutts Cars Limited 
until he was made redundant on the 3rd October 2000. Coutts Cars management headed by 
General Manager Mr Trenberth decided that it would be economically beneficial to reduce 
the number of company car groomers and contract out any extra work. 
Coutts Cars sought advice from the Auckland Employers and Manufacturers 
Association about how to implement the redundancies, before completing assessment 
forms and requesting Mr Baguley and another employee attend a restructuring meeting. 
A crucial meeting took place on the 291h September 2000 between Coutts Cars 
management, and Mr Baguley and his solicitor. In that meeting Mr Trenberth announced 
the decision to make two groomers redundant. He stated a selection criterion was being 
used to determine which employees to make redundant. Mr Baguley and his solicitor 
requested a copy of those criteria but, on advice, Mr Trenberth refused asserting the criteria 
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to be confidential. Following that meeting Mr Baguley was informed that he was being 
made redundant. 
The facts in this case are fairly unremarkable and it is probable the case would have 
been decided the same under either the Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) or the 
Employment Relations Act 2000 (ERA). What is of primary interest in this case is the 
political determinations of the Court of Appeal in its decision, on the effect of the ERA, 
and in particular the effect of the requirement of good faith in employment relationships. 
III EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AUTHORITY1 
Following his redundancy Mr Baguley raised a personal grievance complaint with the 
Employment Relations Authority (the Authority) stating that his dismissal was unjustified 
because it was predetermined and based on criterion of which Mr Baguley had not been 
informed. 
In its findings the Authority determined that the redundancy was genuine, and the selection 
criteria fair and fairly applied. The Authority considered the cases of Aoraki Corporation 
Ltd v McGavin2 [Aoraki] and New Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites3 [Thwaites], 
which were two of the leading cases on redundancy dismissals under the previous ECA. In 
relation to the passage of the ERA, the Authority noted that:4 
First, any major review of leading case law must ultimately be carried out by the Court of 
Appeal itself when a suitable case comes before it. But second, requirements of good faith 
under the Act that apply in relation to the operation of employment contracts, rather than 
to the bargaining for terms of employment or to the entry into new employment, were 
already long and well established in law before the new laws were passed. In this regard 
the current statutory rights and obligations were previously provided by operation of the 
term implied into every contract of employment for fair dealing between employer and 
employee. Reciprocal duties of trust and confidence between employer and employee, 
also bolstered good faith. The requirement of mutual trust and confidence has long been a 
necessary component of the employment relationship. This much is clear even from 
Aoraki and Thwaites. 
The Authority determined that the "employer genuinely reached a decision that Mr 
Baguley's position was ... surplus to requirements."5 
1 Baguley v Coutts Cars Ltd (Unreported, Employment Relations Authority, A Dumbleton, 2 November 
2000, AA 1/00, AEA 1/00) [Baguley v Coutts Cars]. 
2 Aoraki Corporation Ltdv McGavin [1998) 3 NZLR 276 (CA) Judgment of the Court [Aoraki]. 
3 New Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites [2000) 2 NZLR 565 (CA) Gault J for the Court [Thwaites]. 
4 Baguley v Coutts Cars, above, "Findings on relevant issues of law". 
5 Baguley v Coutts Cars, above, "Findings on relevant issues oflaw". 
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It concluded that:6 
Standing back and reviewing the overall fairness of the employers actions, while the ideal 
of perfection was not achieved (it rarely is) the level of fairness and reasonableness 
accompanying this dismissal was sufficient for it to be justified. 
The Authority decided in favour of Coutts Cars and dismissed the case on the basis 
that the redundancy was substantially and procedurally justified. 
IV EMPLOYMENT COURT7 
Mr Baguley, dissatisfied with the Authority decision that his redundancy was 
justified, elected to have his case heard in the Employment Court. Under s 179 of the 
Employment. Relations Act 2000 a party dissatisfied with an Authority decision can elect 
to have the matter heard by the Employment Court. This Mr Baguley elected to do under a 
so-called 'hearing de novo' which is a full rehearing of the issue. 
The Employment Court convened a full three-member court to hear the case, 
recognising it to involve important questions of whether principles of redundancy law set 
out by the Court of Appeal in Aoraki were effected by the passage of the ERA. 
I Employment Relations Act 2000 
The Court began by looking at legal principles in the law of redundancy that they 
considered to have been modified by the introduction of the ERA. The Court specifically 
stated that the new legislative environment required a revisit of redundancy principles. It 
said:8 
[ 43] ... The Employment Contracts Act 1991 has been repealed. A markedly different 
regime has been established in its place. lt is therefore not satisfactory to make decisions 
in reliance on cases decided while the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was in force 
unless they state principles of general application as opposed to principles peculiarly 
arising out of the Employment Contracts Act l 991. Aoraki Corp Ltd v McGavin is a case 
very much in point. As the Court of Appeal made plain , that decision was tied very much 
to the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the emphasis in that Act on the supremacy of 
the employment contract. 
The Employment Court then detailed the law as set down by the Court of Appeal in 
Aoraki, including where the Court stated: "[the] 1991 Act represents a substantial 
departure from the collectivist principles of previous industrial relations legislation in 
6 Baguley v Coutts Cars, above, "Conclusions". 
7 Baguley v Coutts Cars Ltd [2000] 2 ERNZ 409 (EC) Judgment of the Court [Baguley}. 
8 Baguley, above, 420 para 43 . 
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favour of a model of free contractual bargaining. "9 The Employment Court asserted that 
because the Aoraki case was so determined by the nature of employment relations under 
the ECA, the Acts replacement by the ERA was a move to "[set] out to abolish the state of 
affairs described by the Court of Appeal ... and to reverse it." 10 
The Employment Court considered the ERA and its provisions for purpose (s 3) and 
good faith (s 4). In summary, the object of the ERA as set out in s 3 was to build 
productive employment relationships through the promotion of mutual trust and 
confidence, by recognising (inter alia) that employment relationships must be built on good 
faith. S 4 of the Act specifically stated the requirement for parties in an employment 
relationship to deal with each other in good faith, including not misleading or deceiving the 
other party. Such duty was stated to apply to situations including redundancy, or proposals 
to contract out work done by employees. 
After setting out those provisions the Court drew some conclusions on the relevance 
of Aoraki and the nature of the law set out in the ERA: 11 
[49) For that reason , the following propositions expressed or implied in Aoraki can no 
longer apply: 
(a) The Employment Contracts Act 1991 is no longer the source of the law relating to 
unjustified dismissal ; 
(b) The pure contract approach sanctioned by Aoraki no longer applies, the balance having 
been changed by Parliament with the result that it no longer matters that the contract may 
be silent on the employer's obligations in the events that have arisen in this case; 
[50) Instead, the Act of2000 requires something of a return to the collectivist principles of 
previous legislation and some discarding of the model of free contractual bargaining. In its 
place are the doctrines of good faith . .. 
Given that the Employment Court decided that Aoraki no longer applied, the Court 
then went on to explain what it considered to be the principles guiding redundancy law 
under the new legislation. After setting out the fundamental principles of a justified 
dismissal and a fair and reasonable process, the Court said that: 12 
[56) Thus, the provisions of the Act require a new approach to the question whether the 
particular employer acted as a fair and reasonable employer would. This is still a question 
of fact and degree in each case but it is informed and illuminated by Parliament' s declared 
intention to reform the nature of the employment relationship . That question of fact and 
degree as so informed involves a commonsense assessment of the situation, bearing in 
mind: 
9 Aoraki, above, 286 . 
'
0 Baguley, above, 421 para 44. 
11 Baguley , above, 423 paras 49, 50. 
12 Baguley, above, 424-425 para 56. 
5 
(i) The employer's business requirements; 
(ii) The employee's right to relevant information; 
(iii) The employer' s ability to mitigate the blow to the employee; 
(iv) The nature of the employment relationship as one calling for good faith. 
The Court then continued to further develop those factors. It recognised the right of an 
employer to make a commercial decision but stated that the timing of that decision could 
be postponed to ensure that other factors were taken into account. The Court stated that 
there would usually be required some "real dialogue with the employee starting with the 
provision, in all good faith, of accurate information." 13 And noted that: 14 
[57] . .. The employer needs to find out what will cause the greatest havoc to the employee 
in order to try to avoid it, what will injure him the least in order to try and achieve it, 
whether the employee can be used in another position though hi s or her current position 
may be redundant, and which employees should be selected for redundancy if there is a 
choice to be made. It is convenient to call this dialogue consultation but that term does not 
imply that the employer has to seek the employees ' concurrence in the commercial 
decision . .. 
2 Consultation 
The above quotation shows the Court' s view that while consultation is required, an 
employer need not to seek approval of its decision to implement redundancies. In specific 
consideration of the issue of consultation the Employment Court stated that: 15 
[55] . .. Now that the spotlight is on the employment relationship, it is not necessary or 
permissible to speak in terms of consultation being mandatory in all cases or of never 
being required. Usually it will be. The Employment Relations Act 2000 strongly suggests 
so .. . . S IOI , dealing with the object of Part 9 [ on Personal Grievances, Disputes, and 
Enforcement] of the Act, highlights the importance of access to in fo rmation and places it 
in a hierarchy different from and superior to adherence to rigid formal procedures. 
3 Ruling 
The Employment Court had little problem in determining that Coutts Cars' dismissal 
of Mr Baguley was unjustified. The Court concluded that it was "unable to accept that 
Coutts treated the applicant as a fair and reasonable employer would." 16 In relation to the 
non-provision of the selection criteria, the Court held that in not showing Mr Baguley the 
selection criteria Coutts Cars prevented him from addressing relevant concerns he may 
have been able to refute. 
13 Baguley, above, 424 para 57. 
14 Baguley, above, 424 para 57. 
15 Baguley, above, 424 para 55 . 
16 Baguley, above, 426 para 60. 
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The Court also held that it considered Coutts' attempts were "not a genuine process 
but a mockery", 17 and said that the company's conduct "fell a long way short of the 
required standard of fair dealing and amounted to deceptive conduct. .. " 18 
The Court declined to reinstate Mr Baguley in his job as it considered that there were 
only two positions available, and should Mr Baguley be reinstated he would stand a good 
chance of being shortly made redundant again. Instead the Court awarded Mr Baguley 
compensation for hurt and humiliation in the order of $10,000, and three months lost 
wages (or $5,750) for benefit lost on the basis that because of the manner by which the 
redundancy was implemented, Mr Baguley suffered depression and was unable to look for 
work. 
4 Conclusion 
In its decision in this case the Employment Court held that prior case law established under 
the ECA no longer applied in the new legislative environment. In particular the Court held 
that Aoraki and the focus on contractual obligations was no longer valid within a regime 
focusing specifically on building productive employment relationships. 
V COURT OF APPEAL 19 
A Introduction 
Coutts Cars appealed the decision of the Employment Court to the Court of Appeal. 
Recognising the case to require a re-determination of previous Court of Appeal decisions 
in the light of the Employment Relations Act 2000, a five-member coram was convened to 
hear the case. The majority judgment came from Justice Gault on behalf of himself, 
President Richardson and Justice Blanchard. Justice Tipping delivered his own largely 
concurring judgment, and Justice McGrath delivered a partially dissenting judgment. 
17 Baguley, above, 426 para 61. 
18 Baguley, above, 426 para 63. 
19 Coutts Cars Ltd v Baguley [2002] 2 NZLR 533 (CA) [Coul/s Cars]. 
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B Prior Case Law 
Before a detailed analysis can be made of the judgments in this case, it is necessary to 
look at prior case law. Two cases in particular impacted redundancy law during the 1990s 
under the Employment Contracts Act 1991. They are the Court of Appeal cases of 
Brighouse Ltd v Bilderbeck2° [Bilderbeck] (1995) and Aoraki Corporation Ltd v 
McGavin21 (1998). 
In Bilderbeck the Court upheld the prior Court of Appeal decision of G N Hale & Son 
v Wellington, etc, Caretakers, etc IUW22 [Hale]. Bilderbeck transferred the analysis of 
Hale into the new ECA by specifically adopting the previous Court's two-step process for 
determining personal grievance claims. The two steps were: firstly, the decision to make an 
employee redundant must be a genuine decision in terms of being economically justifiable, 
and secondly the process by which the redundancy is implemented must be fair (procedural 
fairness). 
The controversy in the Bilderbeck case arose out of a ruling by the majority stating 
that compensation for redundancy could be applied by the courts irrespective of any term 
for compensation in the employment contract.23 A minority consisting of Justice 
Richardson ( as he was then) and Justice Gault dissented strongly from this decision and 
took the view that in the absence of a specific contractual obligation, compensation was 
not payable for redundancy, only for any unfairness in the implementation of the 
redundancy. It is this view that prevailed when the issue next reached the Court of Appeal 
inAoraki. 
By the time Aoraki came before the Court the makeup of the Court of Appeal bench 
had altered. The three Justices who made up the majority in Bilderbeck- President Cooke, 
Justice Casey, and Sir Gordon Bisson - were no longer on the bench, and the decision came 
principally from the two dissenting Justices in Bilderbeck - President Richardson and 
Justice Gault. It is probably not surprising then that the Court of Appeal had such a 
'change of heart' so soon after its previous decision. 
In Aoraki, a seven-member coram upheld Bilderbeck 's acceptance of the Hale two-
step approach, but held that Bilderbeck had been wrong in allowing compensation for loss 
20 Brighouse LtdvBilderbeck [1995] l NZLR 158 (CA) [Bi/derbeck]. 21 Aoraki Corporation Ltdv McGavin (1998] 3 NZLR 276 (CA) [Aoraki]. 22 
G N Hale & Son v Wellington, elc, Caretakers, elc /UW [1991] 1 NZLR 151 (CA). 23 Bilderbeck, above, 167 Cooke P. 
of employment in the absence of a contractual term to that effect. Following that case it is 
clear that the courts do not have the authority to impose rights and obligations on parties to 
an employment contract that are not included in the contract itself. The Court of Appeal in 
Coutts Cars v Baguley upheld this view under the ERA, as will be seen shortly. 
Although the discussions in Aoraki and Bilderbeck about compensation outside a 
contractual term are not addressed in Coutts Cars v Baguley, the cases are both important 
as they show the willingness of the Court of Appeal to make political determinations in 
their judgments. The cases clearly show how the constitution of the bench in a case can 
shape what an Act is held to mean in practice. 
Another issue considered, albeit only by the minority, in Bilderbeck and of more 
relevance to the issue in Coutts Cars v Baguley, was that of the requirement of 
consultation. Justice Richardson made clear that he was of the view that a failure to consult 
would not necessarily amount to procedural unfairness. He emphasised that an employer 
has the right to make a decision to affect a redundancy, and that consultation should not be 
necessary if the redundancy was genuine as that would infringe upon an employers right to 
run his business as he chose. 
The issue of consultation was of greater importance in the later case of Aoraki. The 
Court of Appeal in its decision followed the line of analysis developed by Justice 
Richardson in Bilderbeck. Now President, Richardson as part of the majority judgment 
held that a failure to consult an employee over redundancy did not constitute procedural 
unfairness, and in some circumstances consultation could not have been expected 
anyway: 24 
It cannot be mandatory for the employer to consult with all potentially affected employees 
in making any redundancy decision . To impose an absolute requirement of that kind 
would be inconsistent with the employer's prima facie right to organise and run its 
business operation as it sees fit. And consultation would often be impracticable, 
particularly where circumstances are seen to require mass redundancies. However in some 
circumstances an absence of consultation where consultation could reasonably be 
expected may cast doubt on the genuineness of the alleged redundancy, or its timing. 
The decision in Aoraki, by a differently constituted Court of Appeal than that m 
Bilderbeck, plainly moves the Court' s attitude towards the employment relationship in the 
direction set forth by Justice Richardson (as he was then). This is the case even more so 
because seven judges decided Aoraki in what was presumably a response to the fact that it 
was reconsidering its own five-judge decision in Bilderbeck. 
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The view in relation to the effect of consultation on the genuineness of a redundancy 
was further developed in another Court of Appeal case under the ECA: New Zealand 
Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites. 25 
The genuineness of any determination of redundancy can be reviewed. If it is not one the 
employer acting reasonably and in good faith could have reached it may be impeached. In 
any such review it may be relevant that the employer did not consult with affected 
employees or consider whether the redundancy might have been avoided by redeployment 
or otherwise. Absence of such steps might in particular circumstances indicate absence of 
genuineness in the determination. 
C Majority 
1 De nova hearings 
In its initial comments on the decision of the Employment Court, the majority made 
some observations on de novo hearings. In deciding the case the Employment Court had 
taken strictly the statement in s 183 that it was to make its own decision on matters 
appealed from the Employment Relations Authority. However the Court of Appeal held 
that in relation to s 179, under which Mr Baguley elected to have a de novo hearing, that 
they "do not take from those provisions (as the Employment Court seemingly did) that the 
determination of the Authority is to be completely ignored":26 
It is clear ... that it was intended that the Court should not be "constrained" by the 
determination of the Authority. But that does not mean the Court should deny itself the 
benefit of considered views expressed by an Authority member following investigation of 
the matter. 
Later case law on the issue of de novo hearings has elaborated on this point. In Sibly v 
Christchurch City Council, the Employment Court noted comments made by the majority 
in Coutts Cars v Baguley and stated that:27 
[44] ... we do not take the passage in Baguley [Court of Appeal] as signifying an intention 
on the part of the Court of Appeal to depart from its analysis in Shotover Gorge Jet Boats 
Ltd v Jamieson [1987] 1 NZLR 437 especially at 440 and 441 per Cooke P (as he then 
was) of the crucial difference between a hearing de novo and an appeal by way of 
rehearing, which analysis has withstood the test of time and has been relied on often by 
the law draftsmen including, we feel entitled to infer, in designing the institutional 
architecture under the Employment Relations Act 2000. 
[47] We therefore agree . . . [that it] an issue raised in the challenge relates to the 
employment relationship problem or any other matter within the Authority's jurisdiction, 
24 Aoraki, above, 294. 
25 Thwaites, above, 571-572 para 22 Gault J for the majority. 
26 Coutts Cars, above, 536 para 4 Gault J for the majority. 
27 Sibly v Christchurch City Council (Unreported, 13 June 2002, Employment Court, CC 14/02, CRC 11 /01 , 
Goddard CJ, Palmer and Travis JJ) para 44, 47. 
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these issues can be raised for the first time before the Court, whether or not they were 
raised before the Authority. 
The reference to Shotover Gorge .Jet Boats v .Jamieson [ Shot over] is to a comment by 
President Cooke that:28 
In such cases it is the duty of the appellate Court to reach its own independent findings 
and decision on the evidence which it hears or admits. lt is entitled to give weight, if it 
sees fit, to the opinion of the tribunal appealed from , but is in no way bound thereby. 
The majority's judgment in Coutts Cars v Baguley is consistent with the general tenor 
of these cases, with the judgment actually citing Shotover for the proposition that de novo 
hearings have not been held to mean a preclusion of prior consideration of the case. 
2 Employment Court 's decision 
In appealing, counsel for Coutts Cars began by arguing that the factual findings made 
by the Employment Court were such a misstatement of the facts that it constituted a failure 
of judicial process, amounting to an error in law. (Under s 214 of the ERA only questions 
of law may be appealed to the Court of Appeal). While not agreeing, the majority did state 
that it considered the Employment Court' s findings overreached the evidence, and that it 
was concerned at the apparent omission of evidence. The majority stated however that 
despite this it considered it could "resolve the appeal satisfactorily disregarding the 
excesses of inference and language that we consider the judgment to contain and we 
proceed to do so. "29 
3 Employment Relations Act 2000 
In its decision, the majority made some significant comments on the impact of the 
ERA on employment law. They firstly noted that the employment relationship was still 
founded on the basis of the agreement between the employer and the employee. They then 
said: 30 
[39] ... The obligation to deal with each other in good faith is not so much a stand-alone 
obligation as a qualifier of the manner in which those dealings are to be conducted ... We 
do not find in the new provisions a warrant to introduce into what is still a contractual 
relationship terms and conditions the parties have not agreed to but which the Authority or 
a court might think it fair to impose. 
This statement by the majority would uphold the assertion m Aoraki that 
compensation for redundancy is not available outside a contractual term. This point is also 
28 Shotover Gorge Jet Boats Ltd v Jamieson [1987] I NZLR 437, 440 Cooke P. 
29 Coutts Cars, above, 543-544 para 30, 31 Gault J for the majority. 
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made by Justice Tipping in his judgment where he notes courts are not to fix contract 
terms, only interpret the rights and obligations within them. 31 
In a significant statement the majority had this to say regarding the effect the ERA, 
and particularly the obligation of good faith, had had on employment law: 32 
[38] We do not see those obligations [s 4] as differing significantly from those referred to 
in the judgments of this Court in Aoraki Corporation Ltd v McGavin. 
And· 33 , 
[40] It has long been the law that the special nature of the employment relationship 
incorporates mutual obligations of trust and confidence. Those words are used in the first 
"Key Provision" of the Employment Relations Act (s3 (a)). In his separate judgment in 
Aoraki, Thomas J collected some of the authorities directed to development of"the mutual 
obligation of trust, confidence and fair dealing." 
[41] In ajudgment of the other members of the Court in Aoraki, referring to situations in 
which a genuine redundancy has arisen, it was said: 
A just employer, subject to the mutual obligations of trust, confidence and fair 
dealing, will implement the redundancy in a fair and sensitive way.34 
[42] We do not see that the new statutory obligation on employers and employees to deal 
with each other in good faith introduces any significantly different obligation to that the 
courts have placed upon parties to employment contracts over recent years. Undoubtedly 
the duty to deal in good faith will have impact in additional areas such as negotiations and 
collective environments, but in the area with which we are presently concerned we 
consider the law already required the observance of good faith. There is no reason why the 
decisions in Aoraki and New Zealand Fasteners Stainless Ltd v Thwaites . .. should not 
continue to provide guidance on the applicable principles. 
4 Selection criteria 
The majority considered the issue of the non-disclosure of the selection criteria to Mr 
Baguley. It noted that while it was appropriate to maintain confidentiality in relation to 
assessments of other employees, the criteria for assessment should have been provided to 
Mr Baguley when requested. The majority decided that although Coutts Cars had sought 
advice in deciding not to provide Mr Baguley with the selection criteria, that advice was 
incorrect.35 It was also stated that advice to deny criteria to an employee would have been 
incorrect whether under the ECA or the ERA. 
3° Coutts Cars, above, 545 para 39 Gault J for the majority. 
3 1 Coutts Cars, above, 549-550 para 64, 65 Gault J for the majority. 
32 Coutts Cars, above, 545 para 38 Gault J for the majority. 
33 Coutts Cars, above, 545 para 40-42 Gault J for the majority. 
34 Aoraki, above, 294. 
35 Coutts Cars, above, 544 para 33 Gault J for the majority. 
The Court continued:36 
[34] If there was any uncertainty before as to whether criteria should be disclosed, there is 
none under the Employment Relations Act. An express object of Part 9 is to recognise 
that, in resolving employment relationship problems, access to information is more 
important than adherence to rigid formal procedures. 
[35] It will not follow from non-disclosure of selection criteria that a dismissal for 
redundancy is necessarily flawed. If criteria are properly formulated and applied 
according to the standard of a reasonable employer acting fairly and in good faith towards 
the employee, subsequent challenge is unlikely to be fruitful. 
5 Consultation 
The consultation issue was discussed by the majority in the light of the ERA s 4 
requirements for dealing in good faith. 37 
[43] Plainly the obligations to act in good faith and to avoid misleading and deceiving, 
together with the importance accorded the provision of information, will make 
consultation desirable, if not essential, in most cases. But as said in Aoraki, to impose an 
absolute requirement would lead to impracticabilities in some situations. 
The reference to Aoraki was to that Court's comment that "consultation would often 
be impracticable, particularly where circumstances are seen to reqmre mass 
redundancies. "38 
The Court then went on to note that while consultation was desirable, the level of the 
employee within the company was a factor that could be taken into account in considering 
the requirement of consultation. Mr Baguley was recognised as being at a "relatively low 
level so that the extent of consultation necessary in an area of business discretion must be 
realistically assessed. "39 
6 Ruling 
In the end, while the majority was critical of the judgment of the Employment Court, 
it ultimately upheld the Employment Court's conclusion that the dismissal process carried 
out by Coutts Cars had been unfair and was in breach of the provisions of the ERA:40 
[ 49] We consider that the actions of the employer fell short of the standard required of a 
reasonable employer acting fairly. Mr Baguley was called to a meeting knowing his job 
could be at stake but having been told little of why that was the position. The invitation to 
comment on the restructuring was not one he could reasonably have been expected to 
respond to. The meeting became heated because the employer would not meet a 
36 Coutts Cars, above, 544 para 34, 35 Gault J for the majority. 
37 Coutts Cars, above, 546 para 43 Gault J for the majority. 
38 Aoraki, above, 294. 
39 Coutts Cars, above, 546 para 44 Gault J for the majority. 
4° Coutts Cars, above, 546 para 49 Gault J for the majority. 
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reasonable request from Mr Baguley' s solicitor and he was then asked to present a case 
for retaining his position without knowing by what criteria he was being assessed. It is 
understandable that he and his solicitor were left with the impression that the matter had 
been predetermined . 
The majority did however allow Coutts Car's appeal on remedy. It considered that the 
Employment Court had not distinguished between hurt for the unfair conduct of Coutts 
Cars, and the actual loss of the job. Mr Baguley was only entitled to compensation for the 
hurt and humiliation caused by the manner in which the dismissal was carried out, not for 
the actual redundancy (Aoraki). As such the majority reduced the award for humiliation 
from $10,000 to $5,000. It also quashed Mr Baguley's award of $5,750 made for loss of 
benefit (from an inability to gain further work because of the way he was treated) saying 
that such compensation could not easily be seen as a benefit lost which would have been 
received without the grievance arising. 
D Justice Tipping 
Justice Tipping 's judgment, while separate, was largely concurring with the Court' s 
majority. His Honour began by stating that the only thing he considered Coutts Cars had 
done wrong was decline to provide Mr Baguley with a copy of the selection criteria. This 
he said left Mr Baguley insufficiently informed, and "[to] this extent Coutts was in breach 
of the implied term of fair dealing between employer and employee which exists in all 
employment relationships. "4 1 
His Honour began by criticising the Employment Court' s comment that under the 
ERA ''the pure contract approach sanctioned by Aoraki no longer applies.',42 He said that 
the Court in Aoraki approached the case from much more than a "pure contract" view 
point, and that that term was only used as an introductory comment "[but] it was hardly the 
underpinning of the Aoraki principles . .. "43 
In relation to the ERA Justice Tipping, along with the majority, noted that although 
there is no longer an ECA, there are still employment contracts. He was concerned with the 
comment by the Employment Court that under the new legislation "it no longer matters 
41 Coutts Cars, above, 547 para 56 Tipping J. 
42 Baguley, above, 423 para 49 Tipping J. 
43 Coutts Cars, above, 549 para 62 Tipping J. 
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that the contract may be silent on the employer's obligations ... "44 His Honour continued to 
state that:45 
[64] I have particular difficulty with the suggestion implicit in the [Employment] Court's 
[judgment] that the Court may fashion rights and obligations between the parties to an 
employment agreement on some undefined and apparently non-contractual basis. 
Obviously rights and obligations which are the necessary corollary of a relevant obligation 
to observe good faith and fair dealings should be recognised, but the idea that when "the 
contract", as the Court puts it, is silent on the employer's obligations in the events which 
have happened, the Court has some general power of imposing terms without reference to 
contractual principles, seems to me to be taking the tenor of the new legislation too far. 
This statement is a clear endorsement of the position the Court of Appeal took in 
Aoraki in denying a claim for compensation outside a contractual term. It also shows 
consistency given that His Honour was a member of the majority bench in that case. 
Commenting on the applicability of cases decided under the ECA, Justice Tipping 
stated that because of the understandably limited nature of counsel argument on what 
effect the ERA has had on Aoraki principles, he would prefer to leave a detailed analysis of 
that issue till later. He did note however that "[it] seems to me that the general tenor of 
Aoraki must apply in the new legislative environment as in the old",46 and that in leaving 
his analysis till later he "( did] not imply any particular disagreement with what Gault J 
[majority] has written."47 
Justice Tipping considered the decision of the Employment Court in relation to 
consultation and said that he entirely agreed, "that if a consultation process is embarked 
upon, it must be carried out in good faith."48 His Honour said that he was inclined to the 
view that Coutts Cars had breached the duty of consultation that lay upon it and that 
"(such] a duty could be seen as the natural corollary of the statutory duty of the parties to 
deal with each other in good faith. "49 
In his ruling Justice Tipping agreed with the majority in its decision that the award for 
benefit lost should be quashed, and that the award for humiliation be reduced to $5,000. 
44 Baguley, above, 423 para 49 Tipping J. 
45 Coutts Cars, above, 549-550 para 64 Tipping J. 
46 Coutts Cars, above, 550 para 66 Tipping J. 
41 Coutts Cars, above, 550 para 66 Tipping J. 
48 Coutts Cars, above, 551 para 69 Tipping J. 
49 Coutts Cars, above, 548 para 57 Tipping J. 
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E Justice McGrath 
Justice McGrath delivered a separate partially dissenting judgment in which he began 
by stating that:50 
[72] I disagree with the Employment Court's view that the 2000 Act so drastically altered 
the legislative principles underlying the Aoraki Corporation Ltd decision. But I also 
disagree with the view of the majority of this Court that the obligation of employers to 
consult over the potential redundancy remains as limited as that outlined in the Aoraki 
Corporation Ltd decision. T confine what I say in this judgment to that question . 
Justice McGrath stated that the enactment of the ERA did not change the provisions 
for personal grievances from that material in the ECA. The difference between the two 
statutes is that "there has been an important change to the [ERA] in the introduction in s 4 
of a statutory duty on the parties to an employment relationship to deal with each other in 
good faith. " 51 
His Honour went on to state:52 
[81] The Employment Contracts Act, now repealed, was a statute which provided, in 
substance, for freedom of contract to set the terms of employment. The Employment 
Relations Act also contemplates that the agreement of the parties is the underlying 
foundation for terms of employment but it also imposes a regulatory overlay. This is the 
duty of each party to deal with the other in good faith. It is a duty which goes to the 
manner in which the parties conduct themselves in the course of the relationship. In my 
view it is only this aspect of the Employment Relations Act which has any bearing on the 
approach to termination of employment due to redundancy outlined in the Aoraki 
Corporation Ltd decision. 
Justice McGrath expressed the view that an obligation to consult under good faith 
provisions would be in addition to any requirements within an employment contract. He 
states that such an obligation ''would supersede the indication given in . . . Aoraki 
Corporation Ltd that consultation was merely an optional albeit often prudent means of 
demonstrating that the redundancy was genuine. "53 
His Honour continued to state that because of the requirements of good faith within 
the ERA:54 
[82] ... Provision of information concerning business decisions affecting employees is in 
my view now no longer a matter of discretion but an implicit part of the duty of good 
faith . Sufficient information must be provided to inform an affected employee of the 
factual basis on which decisions are being made. 
5° Coutts Cars, above, 551 para 72 McGrath J. 
51 Coutts Cars, above, 552 para 76 McGrath J. 
52 Coutts Cars, above, 554 para 81 McGrath J. 
53 Coutts Cars, above, 553 para 80 McGrath J. 
54 Coutts Cars, above, 554 para 82 McGrath J. 
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His Honour continued to state that in providing for the duty of good faith the Act 
exceeds the common law duties of mutual trust, confidence and fair dealing: 55 
[83] . . . It has imposed a higher standard of conduct. I consider that the legislature 
intended that the duty of good faith would require consultation with affected employees in 
a situation of threatened redundancy whenever that was reasonably practicable. I 
recognise that consultation cannot be practicable in every situation such as instances of 
great urgency or a need for mass redundancies. I do not regard such a duty of consultation 
as inconsistent with the employer ' s right to organise and run its business operation. 
Consultation does not involve a sharing of those functions . It does however in the present 
context require that they be undertaken by an employer after having been informed of an 
employee' s perspective of his situation . 
The comment by Justice McGrath regarding mass redundancies appears to recognise 
the view of the majority, which upheld the position taken in Aoraki, that m some 
circumstances, like mass redundancies, consultation would be impracticable. 
His Honour held that the good faith duty would extend beyond providing criteria for 
redundancy selection. He continued that it was plain from the facts that ''the appellant 
failed to meet a duty of consultation of the kind I consider the duty of good faith imposed 
on it."56 He concluded, in agreement with the rest of the Court, that in his view while the 
redundancy was genuine ''the appellant was wrongly denied an opportunity to be consulted 
on whether he should continue to fill one of the positions that rernained."57 
F Conclusion 
The Court of Appeal was largely in agreement over the outcome of the actual factual 
situation in this case. All of the Justices made clear that the conduct of Coutts Cars was 
below that expected of an employer, specifically in terms of a lack of consultation and the 
non-provision of information pertaining to the selection criteria potential redundancy 
candidates were to be assessed on. The diversion of opinion within the Court came in the 
more significant aspect of this case - namely the Court' s conclusions on the applicability 
of the contractual approach taken to employment law during the 1990s to the new 
environment brought in by the ERA. The majority held that good faith was always a 
requirement under the common law and so its inclusion in the ERA added nothing to the 
law of redundancy than that already expected. This view was opposed by Justice McGrath 
who held that good faith was now a ' regulatory overlay' above all other aspects of 
55 Coutts Cars, above, 554 para 83 McGrath J. 
56 Coutts Cars, above, 554 para 85 McGrath J. 
57 Coutts Cars, above, 555 para 85 McGrath J. 
17 
employment relations, which accordingly made certain standards of conduct non-
discretionary. 
VI OBSERVATIONS ON COUTTS CARS LTD V BAGULEY 
Prior to Coutts Cars v Baguley, most people would probably have been forgiven for 
inferring that the enactment of the Employment Relations Act 2000 represented a major 
shift in focus for New Zealand's employment relations environment. The overall object of 
the Act - to encourage strong and constructive employment relationships - was such a 
marked change from that of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, whose stated goal was to 
promote efficient labour markets, that it could not genuinely have been thought the law, on 
judicial analysis, would remain unchanged. Yet following the decision in Coutts Cars v 
Baguley it is clear that principles underlying employment law throughout the 1990s are 
still valid and applicable in the new legislative environment. 
An anomaly of such in the Coutts Cars v Baguley case was the lack of emphasis on 
the policy shift brought in with the ERA. If one considers the comments made by the 
similarly constituted Court of Appeal in Aoraki, 
58 to the effect that the particular statutory 
emphasis of the ECA was vital to the outcome of cases decided under it; it is surprising 
that such a change as made under the ERA did not produce a similar response. In Aoraki 
the Court held that "the context in which [the personal grievance provisions] operate is 
sharply changed by the emphasis in the 1991 Act on contractual freedom."
59 That emphasis 
on freedom of contract as a policy shift from prior legislation
60 was not recognised and 
revisited for the substantial policy shift within the ERA. The whole emphasis of the ERA is 
on the conduct of parties to an employment relationship, and on the achievement of 
productive employment relationships built on good faith. The Court of Appeal has dealt 
with this seemingly major ideological shift in a confined sense by focusing on the fact that 
employment relationships are still founded on contract, and therefore all principles of 
employment contract law developed in the last decade apply virtually unchanged. 
This was not the position of the whole Court however. Justice Tipping, while mostly 
in agreement with the majority, did not affirmatively state his position on the relevance of 
58 The Court in Coutts Cars involved four of the original seven members of the court in A oraki - President 
Richardson and Justices Gault, Blanchard, and Tipping. 
59 Aoraki, above, 287. 
60 Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
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the 1990s contractual approach to employment law under the ERA. Justice McGrath 
conversely dissented from the view of the majority by holding that the ERA, while also 
focusing on contract, is founded by the "regulatory overlay"
61 of good faith. 
Other comments could be made regarding the Court's approach to good faith. The 
majority in this case appear to have been comparatively conservative, by 'reading down' 
the new provisions and concluding that the requirements in the ERA for good faith (s 4) 
involved no more than had been expected of parties to an employment relationship in 
recent years under the common law duty of trust, confidence and fair dealing. In support of 
this proposition is an observation in Thwaites from which it is arguable that good faith was 
already expected of employers: "In the course of the employer's consideration of the 
position and in carrying out the dismissal the obligation of good faith and fair treatment 
applies. "62 
Contrary to this however is the question of what Parliament intended. As there is no 
indication on the extent of good faith intended within the Parliamentary Debates on the 
Employment Relations Bill, the question is unanswered as to whether the legislature 
intended to merely codify the common law position on good faith, as implied in the 
majority decision, or intended the concept of good faith to extend beyond common law 
duties. This latter view is supported by comments from Margaret Wilson, Minister of 
Labour, who voiced some disappointment at the Court's decision in this case, and 
expressed the view that the Court did not seem to have appreciated the wholly new 
approach set out in the ERA:63 
The Act's author said the majority ruling had ignored the change in policy since the repeal 
of the Employment Contracts Act. While "surprised" at the judgment, which harks back to 
case law created under the former Act, Ms Wilson said she wanted to see what trends 
arose as more cases were decided under the new Act. ... "We were looking for 
recognition that behaviour had to be in good faith . We wanted a robust approach [from the 
courts] , but the majority in this case seemed to say there was no difference to previous 
legislation." An opportunity to create strong precedent cementing the change in law was 
not taken, she said. "We have a whole new approach which has not been appreciated by 
the majority of judges." 
It is possible to suggest that these comments, combined with the deliberate step of 
including good faith specifically in the Act, indicate a change of intention by Parliament, 
and therefore that a realistic reading of the good faith provisions would require a level of 
conduct from an employer greater than that necessary under the common law. Such a 
61 Coutts Cars, above, 554 para 81 McGrath J. 
62 Thwaites , above, 572 para 22 Gault J for the Court. 
reading would clearly conflict with the views of the Court of Appeal majority and be more 
in line with that of Justice McGrath. 
The question could be asked whether any of the Court of Appeal bench provided a 
reasonable solution to the issue of the continued relevance of 1990s analysis of 
employment disputes to cases under the ERA. No doubt the political answer to that will be 
determined by whether Parliament further amends the ERA to direct the courts to the 
solution they intended. An indicator of what was anticipated by the ERA's focus on good 
faith can be gained from a Department of Labour memorandum to the Minister of Labour 
published before the introduction of the Act. The memorandum anticipated that:
64 
Arguments are likely to be made that "good faith" is a higher standard than required under 
"trust and confidence." Also, that the statutory requirements of good faith are broader than 
just contractual requirements. The employment relationship will be shaped, not just by 
what the parties agreed, but also on what it is reasonable to expect of the parties acting in 
good faith. 
In considering the stance of the two individual judgments in the case it is apparent 
that Justice McGrath at least is opposed to the continuation of 1990s contractual 
approaches under the ERA. Justice Tipping on the contrary was more undeceive in the 
case. His Honour does appear however to be more in line with the views of the majority 
given his stance on the requirement of the provision of information, and also on his firm 
view that courts cannot impose contractual terms. The question really is whether His 
Honour would impose a term set down in statute. The requirement of good faith, under the 
analysis of Justice McGrath is a foundational overlay above contractual terms, but it will 
have to be seen whether that affects the views of Justice Tipping on another occasion. 
Much of the foundation for Coutts Cars v Baguley can be seen in the progression of 
appeal cases through the 1990s under the ECA. The Court of Appeal has, from the time of 
Bilderbeck, in short succession changed its stance on employment relationships to a much 
more contractual focus. Bilderbeck showed the willingness of a Court bench to operate 
outside a contractual obligation. Aorald, in a major change, reversed that direction in 
reverting to a strict approach under contract. Coutts Cars v Baguley has done nothing much 
more than uphold Aorald with possibly no more forceful a recognition of the need for good 
faith than that under previous law. So it is perhaps arguable that the judgment of Justice 
McGrath is to be preferred for His Honour's view of good faith as a foundational principle 
63 'Appeal Judges Shun Spirit of New Law Says Wilson ' (The New Zealand Herald, 25 January 2002). 
64 Good Faith 'Infused' through the Employment Relationship, (Department of Labour Memorandum, 21 
February 2000, Released under the Official Information Act 1982). 
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superimposed over all aspects of an employment relationship. The object section of the 
ERA shows the intention to have good faith as the building block for employment 
relationships. The issue will be to quantify how much good faith is good faith. Justice 
McGrath specified the non-discretionary nature of the provision of information to 
employees, yet just how much information will probably have to become apparent as more 
cases go through the courts. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The case of Coutts Cars v Baguley, as the first redundancy case under the ERA to 
reach the Court of Appeal, presented an opportunity for judicial analysis on the extent that 
the ERA changed the employment relations environment from that under previous 
legislative regimes. As the case was decided in the Employment Court it appeared that the 
policy shift within the ERA would cause all cases decided under the more contractually 
focussed ECA to be invalidated. The ERA's good faith focus was seen as requiring a 
higher standard of conduct than that previously recognised judicially. Such approach did 
not hold sway, however, in the Court of Appeal. The majority of Justices in the case held 
crucially that the provision of information to employees potentially up for redundancy had 
always been required. The good faith provisions were held essentially to be little more than 
a codification of already existing common law duties on parties to an employment 
relationship. It is arguable that such a conservative approach to good faith does not 
encompass the extent of policy shift Parliament intended in passing the ERA. Such a 
determination will have to wait till further analysis can be undertaken both judicially and 
politically. 
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